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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DANIEL BARLOW,

:

Case No. 940432-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant DANIEL BARLOW relies on his opening brief
and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.

Appellant

responds as follows.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to raise the issue of whether the fannypack
was in plain view on cross appeal, therefore the Court may not
consider

this

issue.

The

officers

did

not

have

reasonable

suspicion that Mr. Barlow was armed and dangerous, therefore a
Terry search of his automobile was illegal.

See Terry v. Ohio, 3 92

U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
federal

constitutions

require

probable

Both the state and

cause

plus

exigent

circumstances before a search without a warrant is justified.

In

the case at bar, neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances
were present to justify a search of the car.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATE HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF PLAIN VIEW AND OTHER WARRANT
EXCEPTIONS AS A BASIS TO SEARCH BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT
CROSS APPEAL THESE ISSUES
The State alluded to the argument that the fannypack could be
seized under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement
because the fannypack "was identified as the type specifically used
to conceal a weapon."

Appellee's brief at 8.

The State has failed to cross appeal this issue and has
therefore waived it.

State v. South, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah

App. 1994) deals with this exact issue. The Court stated:
When an issue is squarely presented to and ruled on by
the trial court, a party should raise the issue either on
direct or cross appeal and not wait until the briefing
stage of the appeal to raise the issue. . . [b] ecause the
State did not take issue with the trial court's ruling on
the validity of the search warrant by filing a cross
appeal, we decline to consider the issue.
The plain view issue was "squarely presented to and ruled on
by the trial court".

Defense counsel specifically asked the court

for a ruling on the plain view exception.
you're not going on the plain view
mistranscribed as "of exception").
all".

Defense counsel: "So

[exception]

(court reporter

The court responded, "[n]ot at

The trial judge found that the fannypack was not "clearly

incriminating."

M. Tr. 114.

Judge Burton also made a finding that this was not a search
incident to arrest.

"All right.

I think it's clear here that this

is not a search subsequent to arrest, granted they were in custody,
but none of the officers said they were looking in this vehicle
2

because they had arrested them.
not an inventory search.
112.

It's not an impound search, it's

There clearly was no consent."

M. Tr.

The State did not cross appeal the judge's ruling on any of

these exceptions, therefore they are waived and the only issue
before this Court is whether the officers could search the vehicle
pursuant to the safety exception to the warrant requirement.
POINT II
OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONDUCT
TERRY FRISK OF CAR
The State cites United States v. Lecro, 855 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.
1988) and People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1988) in support
of its argument

that even if a suspect is securely in police

custody, an officer may conduct a search of his vehicle for safety
purposes.

State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992), also

cites U.S. v. To Ray Tan, 701 F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1988) and U.S. v.
Maestas, 941 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1991) . Besides the fact that these
cases are not controlling, these cases can be distinguished from
the case at bar.
In all of these cases, the officers clearly had reasonable
suspicion

that

the

suspect(s)

were

armed

and

dangerous.

Melgosa, the officers responded to a burglary call.

In

One of the

occupants made a furtive movement while seated in the car (either
reaching for something or placing something under the seat).
officers patted down the occupants before searching the car.

The
It is

also important to note that the officers had reasonable suspicion
tying the car to a weapon--a furtive movement.
In fact in all the cases cited in Stricklinq, there has been
3

a furtive movement made by one of the occupants of the car while
that person was seated in the car.

The officer had reason to

believe that there may be a weapon in the car.

In the case at bar,

there were no furtive movements in the cars at the scene.

The

cars, then, should not have been searched without probable cause
and exigent circumstances. See discussion infra in "Point III."
Compare the level of reasonable suspicion and precautions
taken by officers before the search in these cases.

Melgosa, 753

P. 2d at 223 (dispatch on burglary, suspects ordered out of the car,
patdown of suspects, furtive movement in car); To Ray Tan 701 F.
Supp. at 46-47 (DEA agents dealing with known drug dealers, furtive
movement in car, officers draw weapons, suspects guarded but could
break away from police custody); Maestas, 941 F.2d 275

(burglary

call, suspect drunk & threatening, suspect said he had a gun in his
truck, suspect said he'd kill woman at scene, suspect makes furtive
movement in truck); Lego, 855 F.2d 543 (known drug dealer making
drug stops, furtive movement in truck, officer draws weapon & does
complete patdown of suspect, knife found on suspect).
Defendant

urges

this Court

to require

that

a warrant

be

obtained before search of a vehicle for weapons when there is no
immediate threat to the officers or surrounding members of the
public like the following courts have done:
Louisiana: Officers cannot search vehicle for weapons
which had been stopped for suspected drug activity when
occupants were cooperative and had been removed from the
scene.
State v. Lee, 485 So.2d 555 (La.App. 5 Cir.
1986) .
During questioning outside of shed, murder suspect
informs officers that he has .22 caliber rifle inside the
4

shed. Held: Officers illegally seized rifle based upon
safety exception to warrant requirement because defendant
was not near shed when it was seized. State v. Brown,
598 So.2d 565 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992).
Michigan: Officers cannot search purses of suspects for
weapons when officers have control of the purses and
suspects were isolated in a central location with no
access to the purses. People v. Stewart, 420 N.W.2d 180
(Mich.App. 1988).
POINT III
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT

A.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The State argued that the Defendant's state constitutional

analysis was inadequate. Appellee's Brief at 7. Defendant's state
constitutional analysis was more than adequate
Brief,

12-16),

anyway.

however, Defendant will

(see Appellant's

"beef up" his

analysis

In State v. Larocco, under an article I section 14 state

constitutional analysis, the Utah Supreme Court addresses the need
for officers

to obtain

a warrant

before

a

search unless

the

officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 at
468, 470 (Utah 1990).
Although Larocco deals with the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, the Larocco Court also discusses the safety
exception to the warrant requirement in its state constitutional
analysis:
[I]f article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches
will be permitted only where they satisfy their
traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety
5

of police of the public or to prevent the destruction of
evidence. . . see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
Larocco also quoted Justice Zimmerman in State v. Hvcrh, 711
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J. concurring):
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the officers
with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone,
there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot
take the time to secure a warrant. Such a requirement
would present little impediment to police investigations,
especially in light of the ease with which warrants can
be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute,
U.C.A., 1953, sec. 7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.).
In

the

circumstances

case

at

bar, neither

were present.

probable

The officers

cause

nor

exigent

had no evidence

to

suspect that the car contained evidence of stolen goods, drugs or
weapons.

No one was seen making any furtive movements in the car.

As for any exigent circumstances, they were not present either.
The suspects were handcuffed and removed from the scene. They were
a danger to no one.

In these circumstances, the officers could

have easily obtained a warrant by telephone and then proceeded to
search the car.
State v. Beavers1, 859 P. 2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), also discusses
the need for probable cause and exigent circumstances before a
search can be conducted without a warrant.

In Beavers, the Court

of Appeals defined exigent circumstances:
Exigent

circumstances

are those

1

'that would

cause

a

The Utah Court of Appeals in Beavers also held that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit a warrantless entry into a
residence on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion--the
level of suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory Terry
stop. Such an entry is justified only on the basis of probable
cause and exigent circumstances.
6

reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or
other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence
improperly
frustrating
legitimate
law
enforcement
efforts. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199
(9th Cir.) , cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83
L.Ed. 2d 46 (1984) . The need for an immediate search must
be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh
the important protection of individual rights provided by
the warrant requirement. United States v. Robertson, 606
F.2d 853, 859 (9th cir. 1979).
According
circumstances

to

this

in the

case

definition,
at bar.

there
With

were

the

no

exigent

situation

under

control, the officers could have guarded the car and obtained a
warrant by telephone before the search.

Two other Utah cases

support this idea that if the place to be searched can be guarded
(thereby preventing destruction of evidence and risk to officers or
the public), the police must obtain a warrant before the search.
State v. South, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1994)

(exigent

circumstances do not exist if officers can secure place to be
searched and then obtain warrant for search); State v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991).
In Harrison, although the search of a diaper bag in a baby
stroller was upheld on other grounds (search incident to arrest),
the Utah Court of Appeals suggested, in dicta, that if there was a
way to secure the baby stroller at the scene, the officers would
have to obtain a warrant before searching the diaper bag.

The

reason for this is that there was no longer any risk to officers
because the suspect had been handcuffed and removed from the scene
as in the case at bar.

Harrison at 785.

7'

B. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
There are several United States Constitution cases discussing
probable

cause

and

exigent

circumstances

which

are

on point.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572
(1982) (discussing the need for probable cause before a search);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235
(1979) (when police have evidence securely within their control and
there is no danger to themselves or risk of losing the evidence, a
warrant must be obtained before a search is conducted); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d
(1977)

(police may not search footlocker without warrant

538
even

though probable cause existed for search; exigent circumstances did
not exist where

search was conducted more than an hour

after

federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and
suspects were securely in custody).
In the

case

at bar,

the officers

were

conducting a weapons search of the vehicle.
handcuffed

and

unable

to

return

to

the

not

justified

in

All suspects were

car.

Suspects

were

cooperative and no one made any furtive movements while seated in
the car suggesting that there were weapons in the car.
Terry

frisk

of

the

car was unwarranted

because

As such, a

there

was

no

reasonable suspicion to support the frisk, especially when the
suspects had not been frisked first.

The case at bar goes well

beyond Stricklinq and should not be upheld on the basis of that
case.
Without

justification

for

a
8

Terry

search,

officers

need

probable cause and exigent circumstances before a warrantless
search can be conducted.

In the case at bar, there were no exigent

circumstances nor was there probable cause to search.

Even if

there was probable cause to search, without exigent circumstances,
the officers should have obtained a warrant by telephone before
conducting a search of the Barlow vehicle.
CONCLUSION

Defendant/Appellant

respectfully

requests

this

Court

to

reverse the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress
for illegal search and seizure based upon arguments in Appellant's
opening and reply briefs.
SUBMITTED this

iLtt

day of March, 1995.

risanne Gustin-Furgis
Attorney for Defendant/Appellanv
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